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1 This article draws on discussions with the late Linsu Kim. We were planning to write a follow-up piece to 
our contribution to Research Policy (2002) that was to explore how Asian firms can use integration into 
global production and design networks to proceed from sequential innovation strategies (as introduced in 
Kim, 1980) to concurrent innovation strategies that would combine learning from foreign technology and 
innovation in system-level chip design. 
1 Introduction 
 
The emergence of Asia (outside Japan) as a global export platform base in the 
electronics industry is one of the few success stories of Third World economic 
development. The primary goal has been to catch up with operational, mostly production-
related capabilities of advanced nations and to out-fox them by becoming faster and 
lower-cost followers (Kim, 1980, 1997; Westphal, Kim and Dahlman, 1985; Ernst and 
O’Connor, 1992; Hobday, 1995; Lall,  2000; Ernst, Mytelka, Ganiatsos, 1998; Mathews 
and Cho, 2000; Ernst, 2000). By reversing the sequence of technological development in 
advanced countries (Dahlman, Ross-Larson and Westphal, 1987), Asian firms have used 
production capabilities as the foundation for developing capabilities in investment and 
adaptive engineering, while product and market development and process innovation 
were postponed to a later stage of development. 
These strategies have produced impressive results. In electronics manufacturing for 
instance, five Asian countries (China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia) account 
for over one quarter of world production. Furthermore, while India has failed to excel as 
a global manufacturing exporter, the country has firmly established itself as a global 
export production base for software and information services. These achievements are 
now history. Today, Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries are aggressively 
pursuing strategies to establish themselves as new sources of innovation and global 
standards in industries like electronic components (especially semiconductors and chip 
design), digital consumer devices, wireless telecommunication systems, and business 
process software. In addition to design implementation, this includes innovations in 
process technology for electronic components and in the design of complex system 
architectures.  
A defining characteristic of these “late innovation strategies” is a heavy reliance on 
international knowledge sourcing from global industry leaders, for instance for critical 
component and process technologies. But how is it possible that Asian firms can innovate 
in industries that involve highly complex technological knowledge, while they continue 
to lag substantially behind advanced nations in the development of their R&D and 
innovative capabilities? 
That new actors from Asia are entering the “global innovation race” (Baumol, 2002) 
raises two important puzzles for the study of innovation. First, it runs counter to a 
widespread assumption in innovation theory that innovations and global standards 
necessarily emerge first in a few global “centers of excellence”, especially in the US. 
Underlying this assumption is the well-established notion that innovation requires dense 
interactions within co-located specialized knowledge communities in order to reduce the 
dual challenges of cognitive and organizational complexity (Pavitt, 1999: XI). One would 
thus expect innovative activities that involve highly complex technological knowledge to 
remain spatially concentrated, much less prone than manufacturing to geographic 
relocation to Asia.  
A second puzzle results from the equally well established notion that, as industrial 
latecomers, Asian economies had to proceed sequentially from imitation to innovation 
(Kim, 1997). The cumulative character of technological learning, from acquisition to 
assimilation and on to improvement of foreign technology, would thus seem to impose 
fundamental barriers to a strategy of combining international knowledge sourcing from 
2 industry leaders with the concurrent development of engineering, development and 
research capabilities. 
Unfortunately, recent attempts in Asia to develop “late innovation strategies” are 
poorly understood and under-researched. We thus need to take stock of what is really 
happening. As a first step, I conducted interviews during 2002 and 2003 with a sample of  
50 companies that are involved in electronic design (for integrated circuits as well as 
systems) in the US, Taiwan, Korea, China and Malaysia
2. Using illustrative evidence 
from this research, this paper develops a conceptual framework to explore the 
international and domestic forces that drive “late innovation strategies” in Asian 
electronics industries. Part one highlights challenges that have induced Asia’s leading 
electronics exporting countries to explore and implement “late innovation strategies”. 
Part 2 reviews evidence on the evolution of electronics design in Asia’s leading 
electronics exporting countries, to establish what capabilities have been developed, and 
to shed light on the forces that are driving these “late innovation” strategies. The rest of 
the paper introduces a few conceptual building-blocks that we need to capture peculiar 
features of these strategies. Part 3 introduces key hypotheses and identifies intellectual 
sources that can be used to theoretically ground these hypotheses. Finally, in part 4, I 
argue that transformations in global markets, production and innovation systems are 
providing new opportunities for Asian “late innovation strategies” to proceed with the 
concurrent development of engineering, development and research capabilities. 
 
1. New Challenges 
There is a dearth of research on the recent attempts in Asia to develop “late innovation 
strategies” in the electronics industry. I argue that these strategies are a response to the 
daunting challenges facing Asian electronics firms as they seek to grow and remain 
profitable in the context of rapidly changing technologies and markets. First, decreasing 
returns to export-led industrialization have demanded that firms and states seek to 
upgrade to higher value-added and knowledge-intensive products and services in order to 
sustain profits and growth potential. A number of factors are responsible for the trend, 
including: declining employment generation capabilities (especially when laid off 
workers are not rehired, as was more commonly the case through the mid-1990s); a 
general slowdown of productivity growth (e.g., Yusuf, 2003); cyclical factory closures as 
global brand leaders and their contractors move to lower labor-cost regions when wages 
rise; and truncated local spill-over effects as highly mobile production facilities reduce 
local investments and relationship- building efforts of the sort that generate long-term 
payoffs for local economies. 
Second, successive waves of external shocks-- economic, political, and health-related-
- have introduced periodic disruptions and uncertainty into markets. Innovation is widely 
perceived as an important weapon to shield Asian economies against external shocks that 
now appear as all but permanent features of a fluid and volatile global marketplace. 
                                                           
2 The sample includes eight strategic groups: global system companies, global integrated device 
manufacturers (IDMs), global providers of electronic manufacturing services (EMSs) and design services 
(the so-called ODMs, or “original-design-manufacturers), global “fabless” chip design houses, global 
vendors of electronic design automation (EDA) tools, Asian system companies, Asian fabless design 
houses, and Asian design implementation service providers (both private and public). In China, the sample 
includes state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective enterprises, and private technology firms. 
3 “Globalization”, in essence, increases the integration, across borders, of markets for 
capital, goods, services, knowledge, and labor (Ernst, 2003a). Barriers to integration 
continue to exist, of course, especially for low-wage labor. But there is no doubt that a 
massive integration has taken place across borders that, only a short while ago, seemed to 
be impenetrable.  This has increased the synchronization of economic activities, 
including financial crises and recessions (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998).  
Third, there is a widespread fear in Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries that 
a US-centric concentration of economic power and of the sources of innovation may 
constrain, if not foreclose attempts to move from manufacturing to innovation. There is 
clear evidence that the concentration of economic power has substantially increased since 
the late 20
th century, first through mergers and acquisitions --fueled by the “New 
Economy” boom-- and now through consolidation imposed by recession. In the 
electronics industry, this has benefited primarily U.S. corporations that have consolidated 
leadership in semiconductors and computers (e.g., Langlois and Steinmueller, 1999; 
Ernst, 2002, IEBM). American firms have created new product, software and service 
markets, e.g. the Internet, e-business, advanced microprocessors, and operating systems 
for an increasing variety of digital devices. They have raced ahead in the most prized 
areas of technological innovation, as far as these can be measured by patent statistics. 
The US “innovation score” has more than doubled from 41 (in 1985) to almost 101 (in 
2002), a rate far better than for any other country
3 (CHI/MIT 2003). In 2002, all 15 
leading companies with the best record on patent citations were based in the US, with 
nine of them in the electronics industry. 
Fourth, a shift of regional economic power from Japan to China has forced Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, as well as India, to ratchet up their own innovative 
capabilities in an effort to stay competitive. As its role as a regional economic hegemon 
declines, Japan is less important as a source of capital, technology, and development 
models (Ernst, 2004a). On the other hand, China’s new role as a major market and 
manufacturing base for increasingly sophisticated industrial products, and as a priority 
investment target for global industry leaders, has raised the bar for the above five 
countries. 
2. Evolution of Electronics Design in Asia 
2.1. Relocation 
  Over the last few years, Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries appear to 
have seized upon new opportunities in the midst of  a global downturn in the electronics 
industry, to create commercially successful innovations in the production of hardware, 
software, and services. Of particular importance are attempts to enter the global market 
for electronics design, for integrated circuits as well as systems.  
                                                           
3 The US “innovation score” measures the number of patents granted by the US Patent Office, multiplied 
by the so-called “citation index” that indicates the value of these patents The citation index measures the 
frequency of citation of a particular patent. When the US Patent Office publishes patents, each one includes 
a list of other patents from which it is derived. The more often a patent is cited, the more likely it is a 
pioneering patent, connected with important inventions and discoveries. An index of more than 1 indicates 
that patents are cited more often than would be expected for a specific group of technologies, while less 
than 1 indicates they are cited less often than expected (Narin, 2000) 
4 All standard data sources for the global IC design industry
4 confirm that a massive 
relocation of electronics design is under way to the above Asian countries. Let us look at 
a few illustrative examples. Asia (excluding Japan) is the fastest growing market for 
EDA (= electronic design automation) tools. In 2000, Asia’s EDA tool market grew 24%, 
compared with 6% growth in North America, 13 % in Europe, and 17% in Japan 
(iSuppli, 2001). A survey conducted in January 2003 suggests that, excluding Japan, 
Asia’s share in the global production of chip designs has increased from practically 
nothing during the mid 1990s to around 30% in 2002, relative to North America’s share 
of  60% (iSuppli, 2003: 21). Over the five years until 2008, Asia’s share is projected to 
grow to more than 50%. Such projections are in line with a widespread consensus in the 
industry, confirmed in the author’s interviews, that “the center of gravity of the global 
semiconductor industry …  (is rapidly shifting, DE) …to the Asia-Pacific region “
5, 
primarily centered on “Greater China”, Korea and India. 
2.2. Stages of Design 
But such broad-brush figures tell us little about what stages of design are involved, 
and who are the main carriers of design relocation. Based on a widely used flow chart for 
IC design, Chang and Tsai (2002) provide a useful classification of chip design into 
“system/application specification“ (the three shaded boxes in the upper part of the figure) 
and “design implementation” (the six boxes in the middle of the figure that are un-
shaded)  (see Figure 1
6). I use this distinction to highlight two important features of 
electronic design in Asia. First, it has a much longer history in this region than is 
generally known. And, second, while design implementation has played a dominant role, 
system specification has started to gain in importance over the last few years. 
 
Figure 1: Taiwan’s Competitive Advantage in Digital Circuit Design 
 
Note however that the distinction between design implementation and system 
specification cannot be used to distinguish design stages by knowledge complexity. Of 
course, system specification provides leverage for defining global standards and for 
innovation rents via premium pricing. However, as demonstrated elsewhere (Ernst, 
2004b), it does not necessarily require more complex knowledge than design 
implementation. Knowledge complexity depends on how much functionality is squeezed 
onto the chip, the printed circuit board, or the system. Equally important is the 
sophistication of the design methodology. Knowledge complexity tends to increase 
substantially for the six design implementation stages, the closer chip design is moving 
from the individual component to system-level integration, and the greater use is made of 
“modular design”. 
 
2.3. History: Carriers of Asian Electronic Design 
                                                           
4 Data sources include: commercial consulting surveys, prepared by Gartner/Dataquest, the Electronic 
Engineering Times, iSuppli, and IBS; reports and data provided by public research institutes and support 
institutions in the US and the above Asian countries ; company reports ( e.g. 10K, Datamonitor, etc); and 
interviews with the sample of companies described in note 1. 
5 Ray Bingham, president and CEO of Cadence Design Systems Inc, one of the leading vendors of 
electronic design automation (EDA) tools, quoted in Electronic Engineering Times, 28 February 2003 
6 All figures are in the appendix. 
5 Electronic design in Asia started during the early 1980s with board-level design 
performed in Asian computer and consumer electronics companies (primarily in Korea 
and Taiwan) to provide the optimum in the circuit layout of discrete components 
(including ICs, capacitors, inductors, resistors) and their interconnecting ‘wires’ on a 
printed circuit board (PCB)
7 (Ernst and O’Connor, 1992, chapter IV). Note that, while 
design complexity is low for a simple single-layer board, it rises substantially for very 
complex multi-layer boards (some up to 18 or 24 layers, for notebooks). Combined with 
the experience in detailed product design and engineering that Asian firms have 
accumulated in the fabrication of high-precision components (like ICs), board-level 
design has given rise to a broad portfolio of design implementation capabilities. This 
explains why today Asian original-design manufacturers (ODMs) like HonHai, Mitac 
and BenQ from Taiwan, NamTai from Hong Kong, and dozens of other Asian companies 
are able to compete successfully with the leading US-controlled global electronic 
manufacturing services (EMS) providers, like Flextronics or Solectron (Ernst, 2003a).  
A third carrier of Asian design capabilities are fabless IC design start-up companies, 
especially from Taiwan like Etron, Via, or MediaTek. When these companies first 
entered the market, during the late 1980s, they were focused on semi-custom or ASIC 
design, where the goal was to avoid the very high cost and time required to design a full-
custom IC
8. An important catalyst was the establishment of Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) in 1987 as a provider of contract IC fabrication 
(“silicon foundry”) services for chipless IC design companies. This enabled Taiwanese 
IC design start-ups to gain privileged access to a low-cost, high-speed supporting 
manufacturing system that encompasses both assembly and test, and wafer fabrication.  
An equally important enabling factor for the entry of Asian IC design houses was the 
emergence of global EDA (=”electronic design automation”) tool vendors (like 
Synopsys, Cadence and Mentor). ASIC design required well-defined procedures to 
develop and use cell libraries that contain design modules. To do this cost-effectively, a 
new design methodology was developed where the design requirements were 
implemented in a software language that described digital circuits at the so-called 
register-transfer level (RTL) (see again Figure 1). To implement this new design, access 
to increasingly sophisticated EDA tools was critical. As these tools were available on the 
market, albeit at a very high price, this provided entry opportunities for Asian design 
companies. And as the effective use of these tools always require substantial tweaking 
and adjustments, these Asian companies were able to accumulate a broad set of 
capabilities related to the implementation of these increasingly automated design 
methodologies. 
Relying on foundries and EDA tools enabled Asian, and especially Taiwanese design 
companies to concentrate their limited resources on pursuing a consistent niche strategy, 
with a focus on design implementation and on organizational innovations that make it 
possible to reap as much benefits as possible from competitive strengths in speed, cost, 
flexibility and quality (Chang and Tsai, 2002). This has resulted in a rapid growth of 
                                                           
7 A printed circuit board (PCB) is an internally wired, typically rectangular, substrate which holds a 
number of electronic components.  The internal wiring is accomplished through a series of 
photolitographic processes when the PCB is manufactured. 
8 An ASIC typically is composed of standard building blocks called “cells” that are designed to implement 
a specific customer application. 
6 Taiwan’s fabless IC design industry, producing a 31% compound annual growth rate 
between 1995 and 2001
9. In March 2003, a survey conducted by EETimes identified 234 
Taiwanese IC design companies (Nanda, 2003). Five of the top 20 worldwide fabless 
companies are from Taiwan; and two Taiwanese design houses have moved up to the 
number 5 and 6 spot, capturing 16% of total fabless revenues.  
 
2.4. Upgrading of IC Design Capabilities 
 Three more recent developments have further accelerated the growth and expanded 
the scope of electronic design in Asia: i) global firms are expanding and upgrading their 
design centers in Asia as part of their global design networks (GDNs); ii) leading Asian 
firms are emerging as new sources of IC design, as part of their strategies to upgrade 
system development and standard-setting capabilities, especially in China (including 
Hong Kong) and in Korea; and iii) smaller Asian firms attempt to enter GDNs as 
specialized suppliers, primarily of design implementation services.  
All five global strategic groups in our interview sample have invested in IC design-
related activities in Asia over the last few years, and/or are planning to expand such 
activities. While there are no systematic data on investment outlays and type of design 
activities, the interviews produced three general findings. First, all global firms consider 
the lower cost of Asian design engineers to be an important pull factor. In light of the fact 
that the annual cost of employing a chip design engineer in East Asia is between 10 and 
20% of the cost in Silicon Valley (Figure 2), it is hardly surprising to find that global 
firms relocate chip design to leading electronics clusters in East Asia that provide a 
skilled and re-trainable workforce as well as easy access to foundry, assembly and testing 
services. Second, global firms also consider as equally important proximity to higher-end 
specialized network suppliers of components, manufacturing services and knowledge-
intensive business services, especially design and engineering support services. And 
third, as IC  design expands in Asia, this creates significant new entry possibilities for 
Asian specialized suppliers of a broad array of design implementation services. 
 
Figure 2: Annual Cost of Employing a Chip Design Engineer (US-$), 2002 
 
 
Specific motivations differ across sectors and strategic groups. For mobile 
communication systems for instance, all major global system companies are expanding 
their Asian IC design centers to establish their own reference or “platform” designs
10 as 
de facto standards in the region. This reflects the growing importance of Asia as a major 
                                                           
9 During 2001, Taiwan’s IC design industry’s revenue growth was 18%, significantly outpacing the almost 
flat growth of the global IC design industry (“Forecast for Taiwan’s SIP (Silicon Intellectual Property) 
Industry”, 1 June 2002) 
10 The concept of “platform design” was first developed in the car industry, under the heading of “modular 
design” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). To deal with increasingly demanding 
cost reduction pressures, car manufacturers used a common template architecture for  different car models, 
allowing the sharing of molds and common elements, the “design modules”. This design methodology was 
then applied to other industries, including the computer industry (Langlois and Roberston, 1992).  In the 
semiconductor industry, platform design is an organised method to reduce the time required and risk 
involved in designing and verifying a complex system-on-a-chip (SoC), by heavily and systematically 
reusing as many design steps as possible (Chang, 2003:23).  
7 growth market for electronics products and services. As a result, global brand leaders in 
the electronics industry, like Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco, attempt to push their “platform 
leadership” strategies into Asia
11.  
An additional powerful driver behind the expansion of electronic design in Asia is that 
leading firms from China, India, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are emerging as potential 
new sources of innovation and global standards. This includes innovations in process 
technology for electronic components (especially semiconductors and displays), where 
Korean and Taiwanese firms are among the industry leaders. But it also includes system 
specification (as defined in figure 1): Asian firms are now producing innovations in the 
design of complex system architectures
12 in sectors like digital consumer systems, 
wireless telecommunication systems, and business process software.  
For instance, in consumer electronics, there are joint efforts by China and Taiwan to 
develop a new video-disk technology format, called EVD (enhanced versatile disk) that 
would allow resolution five times higher than the current de facto industry standard 
DVD, while helping China’s consumer electronics industry to escape full royalty 
payments to the dominant DVD licensing groups. Beijing E-World Technology, a 
consortium of 10 Chinese DVD manufacturers, is conducting government-sponsored 
research, in collaboration with Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), 
and Taiwanese disk makers and chip design houses.  
In telecommunications, Korea’s four leading players (Samsung, LG, SK Telecom, and 
KT) are all engaged in serious efforts to become major platform and contents developers 
for complex technology systems, especially in mobile communications. These efforts can 
build on considerable capabilities, accumulated in public research labs (like ETRI, the 
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute), as well as in R&D labs of the 
chaebol, to develop complex technology systems like TDX (a switching system) and 
communication systems that are based on the CDMA (= code-division multiple access) 
standard. Furthermore, China’s attempt to develop an alternative third generation (3G) 
digital wireless standard, called TD-SCDMA (time-division synchronous code-division 
multiple access), has created a powerful motivation to expand Asian electronic design 
activities for all eight strategic groups in our interview sample (Ernst, 2004b). The TD-
SCDMA standard was developed by Datang Telecom, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, 
and the Research Institute of the Ministry of Information Industry, with technical 
assistance from Siemens
13.  To accelerate the implementation of this strategy, Datang has 
                                                           
11 “Platform leadership” strategies are defined by decisions on the “system architecture (the degree of 
modularity), interfaces (the degree of openness of the interfaces to the platform), and intellectual property 
(how much information about the platform and its interfaces to disclose to outside firms)” (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002: 40). These strategies have two objectives: to avoid the very high costs and risks of trying 
to develop complex technology systems in-house; and to enhance and control patterns of innovation in an 
industry. 
12 Computer designers use the term “architecture” to refer to “the partitioning of the …(computer)…system 
into components of a given scope and related to each other functionally and physically through given 
interfaces. From a given architecture flows the design of components’ functions and how they relate to 
each other (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 18). These authors compare a system architecture with a 
geographic map, where the components of the system are the countries’ territories and the interfaces 
between components are the countries’ borders (ibid.:19).   
13 Approval by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was granted in August 2000. The two 
dominant competing global 3G standards are W-CDMA (compatible with existing GSM operations, and 
8 formed a series of collaborative agreements: a joint venture with Nokia, Texas 
Instruments, the Korean LG group, and Taiwanese ODM (= original design 
manufacturing) suppliers, a joint venture with Philips and Samsung, and a licensing 
agreement with STMicroelectronics that will provide the Chinese company with access 
to critical design building blocks.  
These example illustrates that the development of Asian electronic design capabilities 
has passed a critical minimum threshold. Of course, global R&D remains highly 
concentrated - 85% takes place in only seven industrialized countries, with the U.S. 
occupying the leading position with 37% (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001, p.34). For 
instance, China’s total R&D spending is about $ 11billion, compared to more than $233 
billion for the US.And the R&D budget of a U.S. industry leader, Microsoft, at around $ 
6.2 billion (for 2003), exceeds 56% of China’s total R&D budget. Nevertheless, there are 
clear signs that Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries are gradually strengthening 
their position in the international division of knowledge creation. In a handful of 
emerging centers of excellence in Asia, sophisticated innovation and research capabilities 
appear to have followed the earlier development of electronics manufacturing 
capabilities. Let us now turn to possible explanations. 
 
3. Puzzles, Hypotheses and Intellectual Sources 
3.1. Puzzles 
We have seen that, centered on electronic design, Asian firms have been able to 
innovate in industries that involve highly complex technological knowledge, despite the 
fact that they continue to lag substantially behind advanced nations in the development of 
their R&D and innovative capabilities. In addition to design implementation, this 
includes innovations in process technology for electronic components and in the design 
of complex system architectures.  
This raises two important puzzles for the study of innovation. First, that new actors 
from Asia are entering the “global innovation race” runs counter to a widespread 
assumption in innovation theory that innovations and global standards necessarily emerge 
first in a few global “centers of excellence”, especially in the US. Underlying this 
assumption is the well-established notion that innovation requires dense interactions 
within co-located specialized knowledge communities in order to reduce the dual 
challenges of cognitive and organizational complexity (Pavitt, 1999: XI)
14. One would 
thus expect innovative activities that involve highly complex technological knowledge to 
remain spatially concentrated, much less prone than manufacturing to geographic 
relocation to Asia.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
supported by European firms), and CDMA 2000 (compatible with existing CDMA operations, and 
supported by US firms). 
14 As for the cognitive dimension, an artefact like a chip is “made up of numerous components and 
subsystems whose interactions are often non-linear and therefor impossible to predict” (Pavitt, 1999: p.X). 
This implies that verification and testing become a critical bottleneck; that tacit knowledge is central for 
interpreting the performance of a chip, and for “knowing how and where to search for improved 
performance” (ibid). The organizational dimension of technological complexity implies that “…a wide and 
increasing range of fields of specialized knowledge are being mobilized…”, which necessitates “linkages 
with the wider knowledge communities and the capacity within the firm to experiment and learn across 
cognitive and functional boundaries” (Pavitt, 1999: pages X and XI). 
9 A second puzzle results from the equally well established notion that, as industrial 
latecomers, Asian economies had to proceed sequentially from imitation to innovation 
(Kim, 1997). Based on his analysis of the Korean model, Linsu Kim has demonstrated 
that successful catching-up required a strategy that concentrated first on the acquisition, 
then on the assimilation and then on the improvement of “foreign technology to 
manufacture products whose technology and market have been tested and proved 
elsewhere. For this purpose, only engineering efforts are required.” (ibid: 88). The 
cumulative character of technological learning would thus seem to impose fundamental 
barriers to a strategy of combining international knowledge sourcing from industry 
leaders with the concurrent development of engineering, development and research 
capabilities. This makes it difficult to explain how Asian firms are able to produce 




The concept of “late innovation strategies” is used to solve these puzzles. The term  
“innovation strategies” highlights the interactive nature of innovation (Freeman, 1987; 
Nelson, 1988; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986) -  multiple feedback links are developed 
between “innovation management” and “innovation policies” (Nelson, 1993; Gibbons et 
al, 1994). Such interaction is particularly important for “late innovation strategies” that 
attempt to redress the imbalance between excellence in export-oriented production and a 
weak basis for knowledge creation. ”Innovation management” is concerned with the 
development of “innovative capabilities”, defined as the skills, knowledge and 
management approaches needed to create, change or improve products, services, 
equipment, and processes. “Innovation policies” include incentives that induce firms to 
enhance innovative capabilities, as well as the provision of “public goods” (Lundvall, 
2001). In addition to infrastructure, finance, and education, “public goods” also include 
public institutions that, as sophisticated technology users, can catalyze innovations; 
databases on research, “technology roadmaps” and market trends; intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection; and a consensus on the development model. 
The conceptual framework of this paper explores the interplay of international and 
domestic forces that shape “late innovation” strategies, with a specific focus on changes 
in technology and business organization. To maximize analytical leverage, this 
framework is centered on four testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1  
  New opportunities for “late innovation” strategies result from four recent 
transformations in the global innovation system: (1) global production networks integrate 
geographically dispersed specialized production and innovation sites;  (2) global firms 
outsource R&D to locations with lower costs of knowledge workers; (3) brain drain has 
produced transnational skilled migrant communities that can act as highly effective 
carriers of tacit knowledge; and (4) IT-based information management can improve the 
coordination of these diverse networks. Paradoxically, this trend towards vertical 
specialization within global production and innovation networks may enhance the 
mobility of knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders. This may enable late 
10 innovators to combine international knowledge sourcing from industry leaders with the 
concurrent development of engineering, development and research capabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 2  
International knowledge sourcing from industry leaders is critical for “late innovation” 
strategies. It compensates for an initially weak domestic knowledge base; it facilitates 
adjustment to abrupt changes in technology and markets; and it can catalyze the 
development and the diffusion of innovative capabilities ahead of what the market would 
provide. This may explain why Asian firms are able to innovate complex system 
architecture designs. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
“Strategic diversity” results from the fact that the above four global transformations have 
increased the variety of transmission mechanisms of international knowledge sourcing, 
providing choice options that did not exist previously. Hence, countries can differ in the 
policies, institutions, and management approaches that they use to implement “late 
innovation strategies”. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
As a result, it may no longer be necessary (as it was arguably until the mid-1990s) to 
move sequentially up the ladder from simple to more complex technology development 
strategies. A shift to concurrent strategies reflects the growing vertical specialization in 
this industry. As global specialized suppliers proliferate across all stages of the value 
chain, including R&D&E, this opens up new opportunities for Asian firms to choose 
carefully realistic sequencing patterns, and to proceed in parallel with domestic efforts 
and with international knowledge sourcing. While local actors remain the primary agents 
of upgrading strategies, the essence of these concurrent strategies is to complement their 
limited resources and capabilities by establishing linkages with global as well as Asian 
actors. 
 
3.3. Intellectual Sources: Shortcomings and Conceptual Building-Blocks 
To theoretically ground these four hypotheses, it is possible to draw on four 
intellectual sources: neo-Schumpeterian innovation economics; research on Asian 
innovation systems, research on “modular design”, “disruptive technologies”, and on 
“complex system integration” or “integrated solutions”; and research on the impact of 
transformations in international business organization (especially global production 
networks) on the international geography of innovation. While all four approaches are 
highly relevant strands of research, none of them addresses head on the two main 
questions of this paper: How to explain the current new push into cutting-edge research 
and innovation in in Asian electronics industries? And what explains the diversity of 
“late innovation “strategies? 
An additional shortcoming is a lack of communication between the four types of 
literature. With but a few exceptions that I will highlight in a moment, interaction 
between neo-Schumpeterian innovation economics and research on Asian innovation 
systems typically is a one-way street where theoretical frameworks in the first draw on 
empirical research in advanced economies, and then are applied in research on Asian 
11 innovation systems. Even more glaring is the lack of communication between innovation 
research and research on the impact of transformations in international business 
organization
15. Nevertheless, once brought together, these four strands of research 
provide important building-blocks that can be used, with some adjustments, to construct a 
framework for analyzing the drivers and diversity of “late innovation” strategies.  
 
3.4.  Generic Principles of Innovation Strategies 
Research by neo-Schumpeterian innovation economists is typically focused on the 
leading industrialized economies and their most dynamic innovation clusters (e.g. 
Antonelli, 1998 and 2003; Pavitt, 1999; Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Steil, Victor and 
Nelson, 2002). There are however some pioneering contributions that have established 
bridgeheads for research on Asian latecomer innovation strategies (Freeman, 1995; Perez 
and Soete, 1988; Nelson, 1990 and 1993; Antonelli, 1991; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Nelson 
and Pack, 1999; Teece, 2000; Freeman and Louca, 2001). The concept of “late 
innovation strategies” can build on three important generic principles.  
First, in addition to monetary and macro-economic stability, policies are required to 
compensate for “market imperfections” due to the inherent uncertainty of innovation 
(Arrow, 1962), and to provide incentives for knowledge diffusion and for high-risk 
investment in innovation. Competition policy is critical to make such incentives work: 
firms will only invest in productivity-enhancing technology, learning and innovation if 
competition and regulatory reform force them to do so (Mowery and Nelson, 1999: 379). 
Second, innovation policies can play an important role in the provision of a broad array 
of “public goods” that provide tangible and intangible inputs to knowledge creation from 
outside the firm. And third, a coherent broad-based innovation strategy must be in place 
to ensure that policies produce the expected impact on innovation management in firms 
and research institutions. A critical concern of innovation strategy is the “congruence” 
(Freeman, 1997:13) of different subsystems, which is necessary to create a virtuous 
rather than a vicious circle.  
 
3.5. Innovative Capabilities - Internal and External Sources 
Research on Asian innovation systems (e.g., Kim Linsu, 1993 and 1997; Lall, 2000; 
Hobday, 1995; Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1998; Lu, 2000; Mathews and Cho, 2000; 
Naughton and Segal, 2002; Liu and White, 2001; Yusuf, 2003; Amsden and Chu, 2003; 
Segal, 2003; Lazonick, 2003; Lu Feng and Mu Ling, 2003) has emphasized that peculiar 
features of economic structures and institutions offer quite distinct possibilities for 
learning and innovation, and hence should be reflected in the design of innovation 
strategies. Asia’s electronics exporting countries thus have to develop their own 
idiosyncratic approaches to innovation strategies, policies and innovation management. 
As latecomers to innovation, they are confronted with substantial barriers. At the same 
time, being a latecomer also conveys important advantages, as it is possible to learn from 
the mistakes of incumbents and from the problems faced by earlier latecomers to 
innovation. 
                                                           
15 According to Dunning (1998:291), “most of the work of scholars from these disciplines…(i.e. economic 
theories of innovation and the firm, DE) …has not generally embraced an international dimension and, as a 
result, our understanding of the way resources are organized and distributed across national boundaries has 
been constricted.” 
12 More specifically, our framework can build on research that has moved the analysis 
beyond generic principles, to get down to the tedious task of developing operational data 
sets for measuring firm-level innovative and R&D capabilities. Important contributions 
include Lall (1992), Rasiah (1995), Bell and Pavitt (1995), Hobday (1995) and Ariffin 
(2000). Ernst, Ganiatsos, Mytelka (1998), a major study for the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), presented arguably the first 
comprehensive taxonomy of firm-level capabilities required for production, investment, 
minor change, strategic marketing, establishing inter-firm linkages, and major change. 
This taxonomy, which suggested a sequential ordering of priorities for capability 
formation, was largely confirmed in that study’s comparative analysis of how electronics 
and textile firms have developed their capabilities in Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia 
and Vietnam. 
More recently, Amsden and Tschang (2003) have developed a classification of 
technological complexity of different categories of R&D, which can inform our analysis 
of current “late innovation” strategies. Two recent studies provide an additional missing 
link: the analysis of capabilities needs to move beyond the boundaries of the firm which 
increasingly depends on tangible and intangible inputs from outside. Jefferson and 
Kaifeng (forthcoming) identify 23 indicators (“attributes”) that potentially enhance the 
productivity and profitability of firm-level R&D operations, under four headings: 
openess/competition, human capital, feedback links of R&D networks, and peculiar 
features of institutions. This excellent study however is constrained by a lack of 
disaggregation of data; nor does it attempt to get to the specifics of particular sectors. 
And Rasiah (2003) attempts to extend the concept of capabilities to include what he calls 
“systemic and institutional dimensions”, i.e. the role of “intermediary organizations” 
such as chambers of commerce and government-business councils in generating feedback 
links between innovation agents. 
 
3.6. Taxonomy of Innovation 
  We also need to open the black box of “innovation” to establish what are realistic 
options for “late innovation strategies”. We have seen that Asian firms in the electronics 
industry no longer stick to a sequential strategy of moving from acquisition to 
assimilation and on to improvement of foreign technology, before venturing into 
innovation. Instead, there are attempts to combine international knowledge sourcing from 
industry leaders with the concurrent development of engineering, development and 
research capabilities. To address this puzzling feature of “late innovation strategies”, I 
suggest to draw on three intellectual sources: a useful taxonomy of innovation provided 
by Henderson and Clark (1990); the concept of “disruptive technologies, as developed by 
Christensen (1993 and 1997); and  the concept of “complex system integration” (e.g., 
Pavitt, 2003; Brusoni, 2003) or “integrated solutions”( Davies et al, 2001). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) classify innovations by the degree to which they 
reinforce or render obsolete the expertise of established firms along two dimensions - 
components and architecture, where the latter determines what  components are part of 
the system (for instance a computer) and how they interact with each other (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000: 77). Their taxonomy distinguishes incremental, modular, architectural and 
radical innovations. “Incremental” innovations build on a firm’s expertise in component 
technology, and refer to improvements in component technology. With “modular” 
13 innovation, new component technology is plugged into a fundamentally unchanged 
system architecture. “Architectural” innovations use existing component technology, but 
change the way components are designed to work together. Finally, “radical” innovations 
involve both the use of new component technology and changes in architectural design. 
Using this taxonomy, it is possible to argue that late innovators may have realistic 
chances to engage in incremental innovations as well as in architectural innovations. 
Incremental innovations take the dominant component design for granted, but improve on 
cost, time-to-market and performance. Typical examples are improvements in computer  
memories (especially DRAMs) and displays by Korean and Taiwanese firms (e.g., Ernst, 
1998 and 2000). And architectural innovations build on a company’s familiarity with 
market trends and user requirements to specify an electronic system, but use existing 
component technology that is available on the market to implement this design. An 
important example is the commercialization government-sponsored large-scale R&D 
projects in Korea’s telecommunications sector, especially the time division exchange 
(TDX) project that lasted over more than 15 years (e.g., Chung et al, 1998; Choung et al, 
2003). And China provides various examples of successful architectural innovations: the 
development of Chinese-language electronics publishing systems by the Founder Group 
Company, a spin-off from the Institute of Computer Science and Technology of Beijing 
University (Lu, 2000, chapter 4); and the development of  the unique Chinese video 
compact disk (VCD) technology and the successful transition to Chinese DVD system 
technology (Lu Feng and Mu Ling, 2003). 
Christensen (1993) helps us to move the analysis one step further. He has used the 
Henderson-Clark taxonomy to demonstrate that established, vertically integrated market 
leaders typically lead in the adoption of new component technology, while successful 
new entrants rely on architectural innovations. Christensen identifies two possible 
explanations. First, while technological complexity (and hence risk, time, and investment 
expense) are much lower for architectural design than for the development of new key 
components, architectural innovations tend to have much more far-reaching implications 
for market shares and profitability of innovating firms. Second, the key to successful 
innovation is whether there are enough customers who are willing to pay for these new 
technologies and who can profit from using them.  
The concept of “disruptive technologies” (Christensen, 1997) deepens our 
understanding of the market constraint. “Disruptive technologies” underperform relative 
to established products in mainstream markets today, but may be fully performance-
competitive in the same market tomorrow. Disruptive technologies differ from 
“sustaining technologies” which improve the performance of established products that 
mainstream customers in mainstream markets have traditionally valued. Disruptive 
technologies bring to a market very different products: they have features that initially 
only a few fringe (and generally new) customers value. Products based on disruptive 
technologies are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to 
use. 
The existence of “disruptive technologies” can help to explain why Asian late 
innovators who lag substantially behind industry leaders in their innovative capabilities, 
can nevertheless attack incumbents. The explanation derives from the puzzling fact that 
incumbents apparently face more severe barriers to invest in disruptive technologies than 
new entrants. This is so for four reasons: i) These technologies are simpler and cheaper, 
14 and thus promise lower margins, not greater profits: “It is very difficult for a company 
whose cost structure is tailored to compete in high-end markets to be profitable in low-
end markets as well” (Christensen, 1997, p.XX). ii) Disruptive technologies are first 
commercialized in emerging and insignificant markets that large companies have great 
difficulties to address. iii) The incumbents’ most profitable customers generally do not 
want, and initially cannot use products based on disruptive technologies. And iv) a break 
of routine requires a different organizational design from sustaining technologies that can 
rely on customary routines. 
In short, disruptive technologies provide a constant threat to the excessive product 
differentiation pursued by incumbents to reap the benefits of premium pricing. New 
entrants however face relatively low entry barriers for such technologies, compared to the 
entry barriers that characterize sustaining technologies. The reason is that late innovators 
can focus on architectural innovations, using widely available existing component 
technology, for instance in the form of platform designs. 
However, “architectural innovations” for disruptive technologies may not be sufficient 
to sustain “late innovation” strategies over a longer period. The concept of “complex 
system integration” (e.g., Pavitt, 2003; Brusoni, 2003) or “integrated solutions”( Davies 
et al, 2001) can provide the missing link.  
To succeed in the “global innovation race”, Asian companies must accumulate 
experience in managing “complex technology systems” (Windrum, 1999). According to 
Davies et al (2001:5), “integrated solutions” encompass four sets of  capabilities: (1) 
system integration: to design and integrate components and subsystems into a system; (2) 
operational services: to maintain, finance, renovate and operate systems through the life 
cycle; (3) business consulting: to understand a customer’s business and to offer advice 
and solutions that address a customer’s specific needs; and (4) finance: to provide a 
customer with help in purchasing new capital-intensive systems and in managing a 
customer’s installed base of capital assets. By and large, US, Japanese and European 
electronics firms  have sophisticated and proven strategies in place that can provide 
simultaneously these four complex system integration services. But for obvious reasons, 
Asian firms may still lag well behind in the mastery of these most critical innovative 
capabilities. 
 
3.7. International Knowledge Sourcing  
A central proposition of this paper is that “late innovation” strategies need to 
complement domestic efforts with conscious efforts to learn from multiple international 
knowledge sources (H2). On this aspect of our framework, it is possible to draw on a 
growing body of studies that argue that Asian innovation strategies are shaped by their 
integration into international trade, investment and technology flows (e.g., Wong, 1991; 
Hobday, 1995; Lall, 2000; Ernst and O´Connor, 1989; Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998; 
Mathews and Cho, 2000; Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000; Hobday, 2001; Ernst, 2000; 
Ernst and Kim, 2002). These studies provide empirical evidence that, as Asian countries 
progress in their industrial transformation, their reliance on international knowledge 
sourcing has substantially increased. Much of this literature is based on the notion that 
Asian countries can overcome their initial disadvantages through strategies “…to 
leverage knowledge and technologies from their more advanced competitors  … (that) 
utilize the existing and latent inter-firm connections of the global economy” (Mathews, 
15 2002: p.VIII). But international knowledge sourcing not only compensates for initial 
weaknesses. It also facilitates adjustment to abrupt changes in technology and markets, 
and it can catalyze the development and the diffusion of innovative capabilities ahead of 
what the market would provide (H2). 
While the role of foreign direct investment as an agent of “technology transfer” still 
dominates the economic literature (e.g., Blomstroem, Globerman and Koko, 2000), the 
above research on Asia has highlighted the critical role played by more indirect informal 
transmission mechanisms for international knowledge sourcing. This includes for 
instance exposure to best-practice management techniques for R&D through interaction 
with foreign suppliers and customers, especially in areas like product design 
specification, performance and quality control measurements, involvement in prototype 
development, certification through standardization bodies like ISO (the International 
Standard Organization), and sharing of (mostly tacit) knowledge with foreign technical 
and marketing personnel.  
 
4. Global Transformations and the Mobility of Knowledge 
Asia’s new push into cutting-edge research and innovation may actually be less 
surprising than it may look at first sight. It reflects the new mobility of knowledge 
through vertical specialization within global production and innovation networks, which 
in turn may provide new opportunities for “late innovation” strategies (H1). Figure 3 
provides a stylized model of how vertical specialization (i.e. the dis-integration of firm 
organization and the geographic dispersion across national boundaries) and re-
integration of dispersed production, distribution and innovation bases  into hierarchical 
global flagship networks facilitate knowledge diffusion. Figure 3 also demonstrates the 
role played by two complementary enabling forces in enhancing both codified and tacit 
knowledge exchange: ICT-enhanced information management and transnational 
knowledge communities.  
Let us first look at the latter two enabling factors. In all Asian countries, but especially 
in China, earlier “brain drain” has produced overseas communities of engineers, scholars, 
and managers who are familiar with cutting-edge technology and best-practice 
management approaches and who understand the dynamics of international product and 
financial markets. These transnational knowledge communities can play an important 
catalytic role in the development of domestic innovative capabilities (Saxenian, 2002). 
The use of ICT as a management tool can enhance the scope for knowledge sharing 
among multiple network participants at distant locations (Ernst, 2003a). But these 
changes will occur only gradually, as a long-term, iterative learning process, based on 
search and experimentation. The digitization of knowledge implies that it can be 
delivered as a service and built around open standards. This has fostered the 
specialization of knowledge creation, giving rise to a process of modularization, very 
much like earlier modularization processes in hardware manufacturing.  
Under the heading of “e-business”, a new generation of networking software provides 
a greater variety of tools for representing knowledge, including low-cost audio-visual 
representations (Foray and Steinmueller, 2001). Those programs also provide flexible 
information systems that support not only information exchange among dispersed 
network nodes, but also the sharing, utilization, and creation of knowledge among 
multiple network participants at remote locations (Jørgensen and Kogstie, 2000). New 
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chains, and customer relations. Equally important are new opportunities for the joint 
production across distant locations of knowledge support services (e.g., software 
engineering and development, business process outsourcing, maintenance and support of 
information systems, as well as skill transfer and training). While much of this is still at 
an early stage of “trial-and-error”, global leaders in the electronics industry now face a 
huge potential for extending knowledge exchange across organizational and national 
boundaries. However, the uncertainties and complexities of operating in global markets 
means that there are agglomeration economies to be derived from dense spatial 
concentrations of specialized network suppliers. Hence, new opportunities emerge for 
“late innovation” strategies in Asian electronics industries. 
  “Vertical specialization” (or “outsourcing” in common parlance) is no longer 
restricted to the production of goods and services but now extends to all stages of the 
value chain, including research and new product development. This may facilitate the 
implementation of “late innovation” strategies in leading Asian electronics exporting 
countries. Take chip design (Ernst, 2004b). Until the mid-1980s, captive semiconductor 
producers (like IBM) and merchant firms (like Intel) did almost all their chip design in-
house. The first step of vertical specialization was the separation of fabrication and 
design.  The emergence of independent providers of pure-play “silicon foundry” services 
gave rise to a proliferation of “fabless” design houses (like Altera) that focused on 
specific niche markets for integrated circuits. 
Over time, a second stage of vertical specialization has occurred within the process of 
chip design itself.  A primary driver has been a widening design productivity gap 
between design and fabrication.  While the productivity of semiconductor fabrication 
over the last twenty years has seen a 58% compounded annual growth, the productivity 
of chip design has lagged behind, with only a 21% compounded annual rate (Figure 4).  
Given this design productivity gap, differences in the cost of employing a chip design 
engineer have become an important determinant for decisions to locate chip design in 
Asia.  
In addition, radical changes in the methodology of chip design through the so-called 
system-on-chip (SOC) design have arguably further enhanced the scope of vertical 
specialization within the process of design (Ernst, 2004b).  Due to the growing 
complexity of the design process, a single company is no longer exclusively handling the 
design for a specific chip.  Instead, many companies are contributing, based upon their 
specific areas of expertise.  This leads to the development of “global electronic design 
networks” that link together design houses, the licensors of specific design building 
blocks, design service providers, foundries, design tool vendors, design departments of 
large electronics systems, and brand name companies that are all contributing to the 
complete chip design solution. 
This vertical specialization within global design networks facilitates “late innovation” 
strategies in electronic design. As global specialized suppliers proliferate across all stages 
of the semiconductor value chain, from assembly and test, to wafer fabrication, design 
tools, and different stages of electronic design, this opens up new opportunities for Asian 
countries to combine international knowledge sourcing from industry leaders with the 
concurrent development of engineering, development and research capabilities. 
Electronic design houses in country A can now rely on access to specialized silicon 
17 foundry suppliers in countries B and C, as well as on specialized suppliers of assembly & 
testing services in countries B, C, D, and E. Equally important, it is now possible for 
design houses in country A to gain “design-ins” with system companies that are located 
in large markets. 
But vertical specialization does not imply that the “Visible Hand” of large 
manufacturing firms will become invisible (as argued, for instance, in Langlois, 2001), 
giving rise to a resurgence of market forces. “Integration” is the necessary complement to 
vertical specialization, and the resultant geographic dispersion: large global corporations 
(the network flagships) can act as system integrators for the diverse, multi-layered 
production and innovation networks that have evolved as a result of vertical 
specialization (Borrus, Ernst, Haggard, 2000; Ernst, 2002b; Pavitt, 2003, Brusoni, 2003; 
Tomumaru, 2004).  
Trade economists have recently discovered the importance of changes in the 
organization of international production as a determinant of trade patterns (for example, 
Feenstra, 1998; Jones and Kierzskowski, 2000; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001). Their 
work demonstrates that (i) production is increasingly ‘fragmented’, with parts of the 
production process being scattered across a number of countries, hence increasing the 
share of trade in parts and components; (ii) that there is reintegration through global 
production networks; and (iii) that countries and regions which have been able to become 
a part of these network are the ones which have industrialized the fastest.  
The model of global flagship networks (GFNs) builds on this work, but uses a broader 
concept that emphasizes three essential characteristics (Ernst, 2002a, 2002b, 2003 b): i) 
scope: GFNs encompass all stages of the value chain, not just production; ii) asymmetry: 
flagships dominate control over network resources and decision-making; and iii) 
knowledge diffusion: global corporations (the “network flagships”) construct these 
networks to gain quick access to skills and capabilities at lower-cost overseas locations 
that complement their core competencies. Knowledge-sharing is the glue that keeps these 
networks growing.  Flagships need to transfer technical and managerial knowledge to 
local suppliers to ensure that they meet the technical specifications mandated by the 
flagships. Originally this involved primarily operational skills and routine procedures 
required for sales and distribution, manufacturing and logistics. Over time, knowledge 
sharing also incorporates higher-level, mostly tacit forms of “organizational knowledge” 
required for control, coordination, planning and decision-making, as well as for learning 
and innovation (Ernst and Kim, 2002). 
In short, the reintegration of geographically dispersed specialized production and 
innovation sites into multi-layered GFNs and the increasing use of IT-based information 
systems to manage these networks are gradually reducing constraints to international 
knowledge diffusion. GFNs expand inter-firm linkages across national boundaries, 
increasing the need for knowledge diffusion, while information systems enhance not only 
information exchange, but also the sharing and joint creation of knowledge. It is this new 
mobility of knowledge that acts as an important enabling factor for Asian “late 
innovation” strategies. But to reap these opportunities, considerable changes are required 
in Asia’s innovation strategies, policies and management approaches. The key to success 
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This paper has developed some important conceptual building-blocks that we need to 
capture peculiar features of Asia’s “late innovation” strategies in the electronics industry. 
Our starting-point was the finding that Asian firms recently have been able to innovate in 
industries that involve highly complex technological knowledge, despite the fact that they 
continue to lag substantially behind advanced nations in the development of their R&D 
and innovative capabilities. In addition to design implementation, this includes 
innovations in process technology for electronic components and in the design of 
complex system architectures. This arguably indicates that it is no longer possible to 
assume that innovations and global standards necessarily emerge first in a few global 
“centers of excellence”, especially in the US. Second, it may no longer be necessary for 
leading Asian electronics exporting countries to proceed sequentially  from imitation to 
innovation. 
To solve these two puzzles, the paper explores the interplay of international and 
domestic forces that shape “late innovation” strategies, with a specific focus on changes 
in technology and business organization. This framework is centered on four hypotheses: 
First, vertical specialization within global production and innovation networks may 
enhance the mobility of knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders. This 
new mobility of knowledge may enable late innovators to combine international 
knowledge sourcing from industry leaders with the concurrent development of 
engineering, development and research capabilities.  Second, international knowledge 
sourcing from industry leaders is critical for “late innovation” strategies. Not only does it 
help to compensate for an initially weak domestic knowledge base, but it facilitates 
adjustment to abrupt changes in technology and markets. In addition, international 
knowledge sourcing can catalyze the development and the diffusion of innovative 
capabilities ahead of what the market would provide. This may explain why Asian firms 
are able to innovate complex system architecture designs.  
Third, there are no fixed formula for what works best. “Strategic diversity” results from 
the fact that vertical specialization within global production and innovation networks has 
increased the variety of transmission mechanisms of international knowledge sourcing, 
providing choice options that did not exist previously. Hence, countries can differ in the 
policies, institutions, and management approaches that they use to implement “late 
innovation strategies”. And, fourth, as global specialized suppliers proliferate across all 
stages of the value chain, including R&D&E, this opens up new opportunities for Asian 
firms to proceed in parallel with domestic efforts and with international knowledge 
sourcing, and to develop concurrently engineering, development and research 
capabilities. 
To theoretically ground these four hypotheses, the paper draws on four intellectual 
sources: First, generic principles of innovation strategies are derived from neo-
Schumpeterian innovation economics. Second, attempts to provide operational 
                                                           
16 To highlight the complex challenges that lie ahead, Ernst (forthcoming) examines key features of 
China’s “late innovation” strategies in the electronics industry. 
19 definitions of innovative capabilities are derived from  research on Asian innovation 
systems. Third, a taxonomy of innovation is derived from research on “modular design”, 
“disruptive technologies”, and on “complex system integration” or “integrated solutions”. 
Fourth, and finally, the paper draws on research that explores the impact of 
transformations in international business organization (especially global production and 
innovation networks) on the international geography of innovation.  
While all four approaches are highly relevant strands of research, none of them 
addresses head on the two main questions of this paper: How to explain the current new 
push into cutting-edge research and innovation in Asian electronics industries? And what 
explains the diversity of “late innovation “strategies? An additional shortcoming is a lack 
of communication between the four types of literature. Nevertheless, once brought 
together, these four strands of research provides important building-blocks that can be 
used, with some adjustments, to construct a framework for analyzing the drivers and 
diversity of “late innovation” strategies.  
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*= including salary, benefits, equipment, office space and other infrastructure.
Sources: PMC-Sierra Inc, Burnaby, Canada (for Silicon Valley, Canada, Ireland, India); 
plus interviews (Taiwan, South Korea, China)
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Figure 4.  
Widening Design Productivity Gap in Integrated Circuits
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